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Among the most fundamental barriers to the aggressive participation of
many married women in the work force are the disincentives for
secondary income earners embedded in the federal tax code. Specifically,
the current code contains a marriage penalty, which is aggravated by the
progressive nature of taxation and any potential increases in income
taxation. Meanwhile, child-care expenses, a prerequisite for entry into the
labor market, are treated inadequately. Although these immortal problems
persist despite political pushes for relief, new attention to this topic is
warranted given the Obama Administration's pledge for tax law reform.
If the principle to be prioritized is that married women should not face
tax disincentives to pursue paid work, then the tax code must finally deal
with these issues effectively.
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LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
People who complain about taxes can be divided into two classes:
men and women.
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the ages, people have lauded the importance of paid
work, praised the fulfillment it brings, and shuddered at high
unemployment rates.' Despite this general social encouragement of
gainful employment, the federal tax code disincentivizes a substantial
group of people in the United States from pursuing paid work-
secondary income earners, mostly composed of married women. These
tax disincentives take the form of the marriage penalty and bonus, as well
as the inadequate treatment of child-care expenses.
The actual numbers reveal the depth of the marriage penalty: 21
million married couples paid an average of $1,400 in additional taxes in
1996 by virtue of filing jointly.3 That year, the total marriage penalties
amounted to $29 billion.4 A 2001 change to the tax law slightly reduced
marriage penalties, but only for the lowest income tax brackets. 5 Today,
marriage penalties are difficult to circumvent as well. They result from
the progressive nature of the tax code, which not only taxes the
secondary income at the couple's highest marginal tax rates, but also
lacks marriage tax brackets that are exactly double those of single filers.6
The tax code's inadequate treatment of child-care expenses further
.. Internal Revenue Service, Tax Quotes, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
article/O,,id=1 10483,00.html.
, See, e.g., RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS 37, 47 (Boston, James
Munroe & Co. 1847) ("But do your work, and I shall know you. Do your work, and
you shall reinforce yourself."); Jonathan Barry Forman, Making America Work: Alfred P.
Murrah Professorship Inaugural Lecture, 60 OKLA. L. REv. 53, 54 (2007) (noting that the
greatness of the United States has been rooted in hard work); John Paul II, Pope of
the Catholic Church, Address to French Ambassador to the Holy See (Oct. 24, 1998),
available at http://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=700
(recognizing the societal problems caused by unemployment in European countries).
2 See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
' CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAx 27-36 (1997) [hereinafter FOR BETrER OR WORSE], available at
http://Nvww.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/Oxx/doc7/marriage.pdf. These penalties impact
women disproportionately as explained infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
4 FOR BETTER OR WORSE, supra note 3, at 27-36. On the other hand, 25 million
married couples benefitted from $33 billion worth of reductions by virtue of being
married-an average of approximately $1,300 per couple. Id. at 27-36. This results
from the interconnectedness of the marriage penalty and bonus, which, in essence
produces a wealth transfer from two-income, and relatively equal, earner households,
to one or two-income, but significantly unequal, earner households. See infra notes
33-35 and accompanying text.
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 added
Section 1 (f) (8) to the Internal Revenue Code, which expanded some of the lower tax
brackets of married filers to double those of single filers. Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat 38, 54 (2001).
6 See infra Part II.B.
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increases the disincentive for the secondary income earner to enter the
labor force.
Recognizing the inordinate power of the tax code as a policy tool,
President Barack Obama has recently pledged to restructure it.' One of
his goals is to increase the code's fairness. Although it is difficult to
determine fairness in a context so dependent on ideology,9 one principle
seems to be universal: to create tax disincentives for married women to
pursue paid work is counterproductive and unfair. This is particularly
true when the marriage penalty is viewed as a wealth transfer from two-
income earner households to one-income and to significantly unequal
two-income earner households.'0 It is unsurprising, then, that both
Democrats and Republicans support marriage penalty relief, although
the details of an exact solution have been elusive." Proposed bills in the
late 1990s and early 2000s would have offered such relief, but were
vetoed by the executive for other reasons.
This Article argues that the next revision of the tax code should
neutralize the tax disincentives facing the secondary income earner,
setting forth economic and public policy support for the desirability of
this goal. Part II therefore begins by reviewing the federal income
taxation laws that are most unfavorable to the secondary income earner,
such as the marriage penalty. Part III considers the implications of such
laws, concluding that more neutral laws should replace the current
system. This Part also evaluates the costs of such a replacement,
underscores the important results of the natural bifurcation between
married women with minor children and those without, and concludes
that any child-oriented reason for unfavorably taxing the secondary
' See, e.g., Roger Runningen & RyanJ. Donmoyer, Obarna Asks Volcker to Lead Panel
on Tax-Code Overhaul, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?sid=a8yCQsJfpb24&pid=20601087.
8 BarackObama.com, Barack Obama's Comprehensive Tax Plan,
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/taxes/FactsheetTaxPlanFINAL.pdf ("Barack
Obama's tax plan delivers broad-based tax relief to middle class families and cuts
taxes for small businesses and companies that create jobs in America, while restoring
fairness to our tax code and returning to fiscal responsibility.") (emphasis added).
' For example, fiscal liberals may prefer higher tax rates to fund broader
government programming, while fiscal conservatives may prefer the economic
benefits of lower taxation. See also Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1323, 1324 (2008) ("[M]ost scholars would say that there is no distinctive principle of
tax fairness."). However, Galle suggests that tax fairness should consider horizontal
equity-the same treatment of similarly situated individuals-as well as vertical
equity-fair treatment of differently-situated persons. Galle, supra, at 1324-25.
Fairness may also entail neutrality, which, in this context, would not alter tax liability
upon marriage. Nonetheless, this Article assumes that marriage is desirable, as is paid
work. See, e.g., infra note 116.
10 See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
For example, liberals prioritize the advancement of women in the workforce as
a cause in itself, while conservatives value the various benefits gained by decreasing
taxation.
12 Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAx L. REv. 1, 2 (2000).
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income earner is flawed. Finally, Part IV recommends ways to neutralize
the tax code so as to not disincentivize married women, whether childless
or not, from pursuing paid work. If the principle to be prioritized is that
married women should not face tax penalties when choosing to pursue
paid work, then the tax code must finally deal with the current
disincentives effectively.
II. REVIEW OF THE CURRENT TAX CODE FRAMEWORK
The federal tax code, as currently conceived, holds certain
disadvantages for all secondary income earners. These disadvantages,
however, disproportionately impact married women. Most important
among them are the marriage penalty and the inadequate treatment of
child-care expenses.13
A. Married Women as Secondary Income Earners
It is important to note at the outset that although this Article focuses
on married women, it applies equally to the households wherein the
secondary income earner or non-wage-earning spouse is the husband. In
fact, the wife out-earns the husband in about a quarter of married
households.14 Notably, however, it is the secondary income earner that is
of utmost importance here, whether male or female, because this wage-
earner is most affected by the tax code. This is because the typical
household tends to consider the bigger income, or the primary income,
as more indispensable than the secondary one, which is smaller by
definition. Therefore, the secondary income is more flexible and
" Although this Article restricts itself to the federal tax code, there are also many
state law disincentives for married women to work. These include alimony guidelines
and the case law of various states, the latter illustrated by Bonjour v. Bonjour, in which
a trial court found against the biological working mother in favor of a homemaking
stepmother. 566 P.2d 667 (Alaska 1977), rev'd, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
Specifically, the trial court judge found that "[iun a family sense the social needs of
Joseph can best be met at this time by Randall [the biological father], who is able to
provide in his family unit a surrogate mother in Susan who is a full-time
homemaker.... In the custody of Lindsey [the biological mother], Joseph is placed
in a day care center for a good portion of a day while Lindsey is working. While I give
preference to the family unit in child care, I am not implying that child care
institutions are unfit places." Bonjour, 592 P.2d at 1237. See also SANFORD N. KATZ,
FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 104-06 (2003) (noting that in many custody cases the court
prefers the primary caretaker, which will likely be the parent who works less, if at all).
" Among married-couple families where both the wife and husband earn
income, 26% of wives earned more than their husbands in 2005. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CHARTING THE U.S. LABOR MARKET IN 2006, chart 6-5
(2007) [hereinafter LABOR MARKET], http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2006/
chartbook.pdf; see also Debra DiMaggio, The "Prodigious Spouse": Equitable Distribution
and Wealthy Wage Earner, 91 ILL. B.J. 460, 464 (2003) ("The stereotype of the nonwage-
earning spouse is a woman who does not work outside the home. However, increasing
numbers of women are the heads of household and even more women work outside
the home.").
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dispensable, and its earner may be particularly susceptible to the
behavior-driving policies embedded in the tax code.
Nonetheless, married women are disproportionately secondary
income earners for several reasons. 5 Most importantly, women take part-
time and flexible jobs more frequently than men, mostly to
accommodate their children. 6 Furthermore, maternity programs are
often far more popular, in addition to being lengthier and having more
benefits, than paternity ones.17 Women's decisions to temporarily leave
the workforce, however, are reflected in their wages, which have
historically been lower than men's.' 8 As a result, married women are
usually the secondary income earner in their households and are thus
disproportionately affected by tax policies such as the marriage penalty.
Much ink has been spilled on this gender bias in the tax code,'9
which results from the tax provisions concerning, for example, limited
'5 By 2005, only 35¢ of every dollar of married-couple family income were earned
by the wife. See LABOR MARKET, supra note 14. Furthermore, the average male joint
filer reported earnings of $47,293 in 1998, while the average female joint filer
reported earnings of $22,628. Peter Sailer et al., Income by Gender and Age from
Information Returns, 1998, STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2001-2002, at 83, 97 tbl.3,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/98ingdag.pdf.
16 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et al., Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young
Professionals in the Corporate and Financial Sectors 2-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14681, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w14681.pdf (finding that many women curtail their work after having children); Alex
M. David, New York City Bar, Law Firm Diversity Benchmarking Report: 2006 Report to
Signatories of the Statement of Diversity Principles, in BEYOND DIVERSIrY 101, at 213, 235
(2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/minofities/docs/FirmBenchmarking
06.pdf (determining that over nine percent of New York City women attorneys work
flexibly compared to about one percent of men); Marin Clarkberg & Phyllis Moen,
Understanding the Time Squeeze: Married Couples' Preferred and Actual Work-Hour Strategies,
44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1115, 1133 (2001) (noting that women, not men, typically
prefer part-time work); see also infra note 64 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-31 (2003)
(summarizing the workplace expectation that women bear the burden of caring for
the family); Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 2d 728, 743-44 (S.D. Iowa 2004),
affd, 431 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2005) (determining that an employer's differential
treatment of biological fathers and mothers was justified when work leave was
characterized as being for disability related to pregnancy, not for care-giving).
"S In a recent study on the earnings of MBA graduates, researchers found that
the major difference in earnings between males and females was caused by several
factors, including career interruptions and the difference in hours per week worked
between the two groups, with women curtailing their work contributions after having
children. Bertrand et al., supra note 16, at 2-4. Specifically, in 2007, women earned
77.8V for every $1 men earned. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES--PEOPLE, tbl.P-40, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
income/histinc/incpertoc.html. Of course, this does not mean than men out-earn
their wives in every household, just in most. See also supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
,9 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U.
CIN. L. REv. 787 (1997) (considering the marriage penalty for African American
families); Lora Cicconi, Comment, Competing Goals Amidst the "Opt-Out" Revolution: An
Examination of Gender-Based Tax Reform in Light of New Data on Female Labor Supply, 42
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child-care assistance and the lack of social security provisions for
homemakers. Nonetheless, renewing this discourse is particularly
important given President Barack Obama's apparent determination to
overhaul the federal income tax code.20
Admittedly, a singular tax disincentive may not cause a mass exodus
of married women from the work force. However, the current tax
disincentives collectively place a notable burden on the secondary
income earner. Furthermore, while these tax disincentives may be only
one factor that a married woman considers before seeking employment,
it is a consequential factor in altering the costs of the various choices,
particularly for people at the margin. If the principle to be prioritized is
that married women should not face tax disincentives to pursue paid
work, then the tax code must finally eradicate these disincentives.
B. The Marimage Penalty and the Marriage Bonus
The marriage penalty is one of the most important distortions for
married women in the labor force. The crux of the marriage penalty lies
in the joint return and the progressive tax-rate structure: each income
22bracket is taxed at a higher percentage than the previous one. However,
the marginal dollar triggering each successive tax bracket on the married
schedule is not exactly double the single schedule, a discrepancy that
GONZ. L. REv. 257 (2006/07) (discussing the impact of the marriage penalty on
women's issues); Richard L. Elbert, Comment, Love, God, and Country: Religious
Freedom and the Marriage Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1171, 1174-85 (1995)
(outlining the background of the penalty); Edward J. McCaffery, Where's the Sex in
Fiscal Sociology? Taxation and Gender in Comparative Perspective (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. in Law,
Econ. and Org., Paper No. C07-12, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1020360 (considering taxation's impact on women from a comparative
perspective); and Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the "Marriage
Penalty" Problem, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 907 (1999) (suggesting ways to alleviate the
penalty).'0 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
2 This Article limits its analysis to the federal tax code's disincentives for working
women. Other penalties on marriage not considered include, for example, the
disability laws. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the
Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1307, 1390 (2009). The private sector may
also strongly influence women's decisions to enter the work force. A recent Wall Street
Journal story reported that licensing regulations have increased dramatically, raising
the costs of entering a particular field, "Overall, the level of licensing regulation in
the workplace is rising precipitously, with more than 20% of the workforce now
required to get a permit to do their jobs-up from 4.5% in the 1950s." Licensed to Kill,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2007, at A14. This increasing private regulation of certain
industries may contribute to deterring women from pursuing careers in those fields
because of family demands on their time. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying
text. To take the example of lawyers: American attorneys typically undergo seven
years of higher education, as opposed to three or four in European countries, such as
England and Poland, where the law degree is completed during the undergraduate
years. The comparative cost of entering the legal market in the United States is thus
higher. See also supra note 13.
See I.R.C. § 1 (2006); infta note 29.
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starts at the 25% rate.23 It is important to note that the marriage penalty
technically results from the size of the tax brackets of the various tax
schedules, whereas the higher tax rates for the secondary income due to
its addition onto the primary income instead results from income
stacking. Accordingly, not only is the secondary wage-earner's income
taxed at higher rates than the primary wage-earner's income by virtue of
being appended, but each spouse has a smaller tax bracket than he
would have if he were single.24
In the most extreme case, therefore, if a married woman's after-tax
income falls below minimum wage, she may elect to remain at home.
This situation is plausible if she makes approximately the minimum wage
and is taxed at the highest tax bracket because of her husband's more
substantial income. In addition, due to the lack of marriage tax brackets
that are double those of single filers, the marriage penalty requires more
tax payments from these two-earner spouses than the sum of the tax
payments they would make if they were single individuals.
If a woman makes an amount of money equal to her husband, she
suffers the marriage penalty the most.2" Specifically, equal-earning
couples double their income upon marriage and, therefore, only double
tax brackets would make their decision to marry tax neutral. For
instance, if both spouses earn $75,000 annually, they pay $30,264 in taxes
in 2009. If they were single, on the other hand, they would pay a total of
$29,876 in taxes in 2009.26 This difference grows substantially as each
spouse earns more money.27 The end result is that many married couples
23 The 2009 marginal dollar triggering amounts for each successive tax bracket
can be found in the notes following I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. 2009). Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-
46 I.R.B. 1107, 1109-10; infra note 29.
24 However, this is true only after the 15% tax bracket; the marriage penalty
begins at the 25% tax bracket. I.R.C. § 1 (2006); infra note 29.
Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint
Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1469, 1479 (1997) ("The marriage penalty is greatest
when the household income is divided evenly."). This significantly impacts
professional couples, wherein the spouses earn equally high salaries. See infra note 29.
For the argument that the marriage penalty also significantly affects African
American couples, see Brown, supra at 1501.
" Although this may seem like an insignificant penalty, it not only increases with
income, but it also inherently implicates the meaning of fairness. See infra notes 29
and 78; Galle, supra note 9.
" For married couples, filing separately during the duration of the marriage is
not usually advantageous when compared to filing jointly-each spouse must
nonetheless use the rates for married individuals filing separately, as optiosed to the
more favorable single person rates. Furthermore, spouses who file separately must
necessarily forego many helpful tax-cutting credits and deductions. Therefore, filing
separately while married is a relatively limited tool in decreasing tax liability that is
used most frequently in special circumstances, such as, for example, when one spouse
has high medical expenses and a low income, thereby meeting the 7.5% threshold
necessary to itemize medical costs. Many married couples would therefore not benefit
by filing separately when they could file jointly, so they choose to file jointly.
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pay higher taxes than their unmarried counterparts in the same
economic position.28
There is a marriage bonus in the current tax code as well, which
benefits only one-income and significantly unequal two-income earner
couples. This bonus also results from the larger tax brackets on the
married schedule, which are not necessarily double the brackets of the
single schedule." Specifically, when there is only one income measured
against the larger tax brackets on the married schedule, it becomes more
difficult to reach each higher bracket. In other words, the larger the tax
brackets for married couples, the higher the amount of household
income that is taxed at lower brackets. In one-income or significantly
unequal two-income earner households, therefore, the sole or greater
income earner has the benefit of larger marriage brackets that are
intended to accommodate two incomes. This results in a marriage bonus
for certain households.
For example, if a single man earns $85,000, he is in the 28% tax
bracket. As the table in footnote 29 illustrates, however, once he marries
someone with little or no income, his income drops safely into the 25%
tax bracket. This encourages the secondary wage earner, usually the
wife, to earn less so as to qualify for a lower income tax bracket for the
This table contains the exact tax liability for a married couple versus the tax
liabilities of two financiall similarly-situated single people in 2009:
10% 15% 25% 28% Tax
Income marginal marginal marginal marginal Liability
$ trigger $ trigger $ trigger $ triggerBob
(Single) $75,000 $0 $8,350 $33,950 $82,250 $14,938




Cindy $150,000 $0 $16,700 $67,900 $137,050 $30,264
(Married) I
Based on Lloyd H. Mayer, Federal Income Taxation Lecture (November 2007) (with
permission) (original on file with author).
218 Id. For the argument that tax fairness must include horizontal equity, or the
same treatment of similarly situated individuals, see Galle, supra note 9.
2 This table shows the marginal dollar amounts that trigger each successive tax
bracket for married couples filing jointly and single individuals in 2009:
J 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35%
Single $0 $8,350 $33,950 $82,250 $171,550 $372,950
Married $0 $16,700 $67,900 $137,050 $208,850 $372,950
Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107, 1109-10. At higher tax rates, the marriage
penalty becomes increasingly steeper.
3' See supra note 29.
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combined income."1 Nonetheless, the marriage bonus has been widely
considered a benefit of marriage, with these attendant disincentives for
32the secondary income earner largely overlooked.
In essence, this marriage bonus is funded by the marriage penalty. In
1996, for example, 21 million married couples paid marriage penalties
that amounted to $29 billion 3 Meanwhile, 25 million married couples
benefited from $33 billion worth of tax reductions by virtue of being
married-an average of approximately $1,300 per couple.34 This
resembles a transfer of wealth by method of tax law. The households that
benefit from such a transfer consist of one-income or significantly
unequal two-income earner households who receive the marriage bonus.
Meanwhile, relatively equal two-income earner households often pay
extra taxes due to the marriage penalty.
35
Any such interconnectedness between the marriage penalty and the
marriage bonus inevitably results from the progressive tax structure. If
Congress attempts to reduce the marriage penalty, the marriage bonus
only worsens. Specifically, if the taxation rates on the married schedule
were exactly double those of the single schedule, then the marriage
penalty would be eliminated but the bonus would increase-a one-
income earner couple would reap the maximum benefit by falling into a
lower tax bracket by virtue of the larger brackets available to married
couples.
Because the alleviation of the marriage penalty aggravates the
marriage bonus and vice versa, and both have their disadvantages, the
question becomes which phenomenon is better to eliminate from the
current tax structure. On the one hand, the marriage penalty
disincentivizes married women from pursuing paid work. On the other,
the marriage bonus incentivizes one-income or significantly unequal two-
income earner marriages, although it does not place an increased tax
burden on secondary income earners who choose to work. The marriage
bonus is therefore preferable to the marriage penalty, so that people's
pursuit of paid labor is not proactively penalized. Any policy decision
aiming to eliminate the tax disincentives for married women to work
would therefore advocate eliminating the marriage penalty, at the risk of
simultaneously incentivizin 9 one-income and significantly unequal two-
income earner households.
" See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
3 Same-sex marriage advocates therefore seek to gain this tax code advantage for
same-sex couples. However, the secondary income earner in such unions would face
the same work disincentives as many married women. See generally Theodore P. Seto,
The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1529 (2008).
3s FOR BETrER OR WORSE, supra note 3, at 29-30.
34 Id.
'5 See supra text accompanying notes 22-28.
See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. However, the resulting windfall
to one-income and significantly unequal two-income earner households could be
alleviated by, for example, widening tax brackets only for roughly equal two-income
2009]
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In sum, both the marriage penalty and marriage bonus provide tax
disincentives for secondary income earners, usually married women,37 to
work. As alleviating one aggravates the other in the current progressive
tax framework, the marriage bonus is preferable in that it does not
penalize married women for participating in the labor force. When there
are children involved, however, the tax disincentives for a secondary
income earner to pursue paid work only strengthen.
C. The Child-Care Credit
For those married, working women with children, the tax situation is
even more disadvantageous. With no deduction and only a slight tax
credit for child-care expenses, married mothers must consider not only
the increased taxation of their earnings and the worsening of their labor
market prospects, but also the cost of childcare.3 s These impediments are
sufficient to create a noteworthy barrier between potential secondary
income earners and the labor force.
In Smith v. Commissioner, which remains the controlling case on the
deductibility of child-care expenses, the tax court rejected the taxpayer's
appeal for a deduction of child-care expenses.39 The court reasoned,
"The wife's services as custodian of the home and protector of its
children are ordinarily rendered without monetary compensation. There
results no taxable income from the performance of this service and the
correlative expenditure is personal and not susceptible of deduction. 40
Meanwhile, the court ignored the argument that child-care expenses
married couples, or by benefiting only these couples with offsets to the tax marriage
penalty. See infranotes 117-19 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
For a summary of the labor market challenges mothers face, including lower
wages, see Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1359 (2008). On the other hand, abstaining from paid work often
diminishes human capital. See Joyce P. Jacobsen & Laurence M. Levin, Effects of
Intermittent Labor Force Attachment on Women's Earnings, 118 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 14, 14
(1995) ("First, women who leave the labor force and later re-enter do not build up
seniority, which, by itself, often leads to higher wages. Second, women who return to
the labor force are less likely to receive on-the-job training to increase their
productivity and thereby raise their pay. Third, when women are not in the work
force, their job skills may depreciate. Finally, employers may view gaps in work history
as a signal that women who leave may do so again.").
" 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), affd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
40 Id. at 1039. See also I.R.C. § 262(a) (2006) (noting that "no deduction shall be
allowed for personal, living, or family expenses"). The non-taxability of a
homemaker's work has led some scholars to argue that the value of a homemaker's
work should be taxed, which would increase respect and security for those women
remaining in the domestic sphere. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84
GEO. L.J. 1571, 1647 (1996) ("Congress should value and tax household activities to
ensure women have access to social welfare benefits typically tied to waged labor, such
as social security, disability, and [M]edicare benefits. Taxation would mark an
important step toward the formal recognition of women as important economic and
political actors.").
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constitute a condition to entering the paid workforce. Nonetheless, no
deduction is currently permitted for child-care expenses, even though
the cost to the U.S. Treasury would mostly be restricted to a couple's
marginal top tax rate multiplied by the cost of the childcare, and perhaps
would even be entirely offset by increased tax revenues generated by
41increased employment rates among secondary income earners.
Although there is some relief for working mothers through the child-
care credit, it has some practical limitations. 42 The child-care credit,
embedded in Internal Revenue Code Section 21, is for taxpayers who
incur employment-related expenses to be gainfully employed. 43 The
credit amount is determined by the amount of employment-related child-
care expenses, the number of children, and the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income. However, child-care expenses cannot exceed the earned income
44of the spouse with the lower income. Thus, if a married woman, as a
secondary income earner, cannot earn enough to pay for childcare, she
loses the full benefit of the child-care credit, even though her spouse
would be contributing to child-care costs as well.4 5 This limitation
therefore favors those married women with children who earn more than
46child-care costs because it offsets such costs. However, these women are
also disproportionately affected by the marriage penalty and bonus,
which heighten with each higher income bracket. 47
Even more perversely, the child-care tax credit, by requiring that
child-care expenses not exceed the earned income of the spouse with the
lower income, creates incentives for working parents to buy the cheapest
childcare, decreasing the parents' choice of where to place their children
during work hours. Imposing such limits seems particularly unfair when
both working parents contribute to the costs of childcare, yet only the
lower of the two parents' incomes determines whether the household
gains the tax benefit.
Another limitation of the child-care credit is that it does not apply
against the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), social security,
4" See also infra text accompanying notes 126-27.
42 I.R.C. § 21 (2006).
43 ld. § 21(b) (2) (A). The amount of employment-related child-care expenses
cannot exceed $3,000 for one child and $6,000 for two or more children. Id. § 21 (c).
Several years ago, for example, "[in] a household with a wife and husband, both
employed, with a total income of $30,000, two children, and expenses of $4,800 or
more, the credit (which reduces the amount of tax payable dollar-for-dollar) would
be $960." WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 479 (2009).
4 I.R.C. § 21(d)(1)(B).
'5 There is an exemption for student or disabled spouses, who are treated as if
they earn $250 or $500 monthly, depending on their number of children. Id.
§ 21(d) (2).
46 There are, however, additional but less obvious costs to abstaining from the
labor force, such as diminished human capital. SeeJacobsen & Levin, supra note 38, at
14.
7 See supra note 29.
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48
or Medicare taxes . Instead, it applies only against a secondary income
earner's income tax. This limitation of the credit therefore requires
married women to earn enough income not only to exceed child-care
expenses, but also to offset social security and Medicare costs. These
additional costs to working, which must be considered by any secondary
income earner, are only worsened by child-care costs.
Finally, the child-care tax credit disappears through phase-outs based
on household income. 4" Accordingly, a married woman whose husband
earns a more substantial income has the least incentive to work under the
tax code; she is taxed at a much higher income tax rate than if she were
single and cannot offset child-care costs through a meaningful deduction
or tax credit, even when the main cost to her employment is childcare. In
any case, wealthier couples might be helped more by a child-care
deduction, rather than a small tax credit that phases out based on
income. 50 Specifically, a deduction reduces people's taxable income in
addition to having the potential to lower their marginal top tax rate.
Obviously, the child-care tax credit aids only married women with
children. Married women without children remain penalized by the
marriage penalty, without any offsets through deductions or tax credits.
Single working mothers fare best under this framework not only because
they circumvent the marriage penalty, but also because they can collect
the child-care tax credit, assuming their child-care costs do not exceed
their income. While single mothers may certainly need the tax break
given their households' subsistence on a single income, there is no
reason to intentionally incentivize households to have a single income
51earner through the tax code's structure.
Finally, it is worth noting that Section 129 of the Internal Revenue
Code also aims to assist working parents.52 This tax provision excludes
from an employee's gross income the amounts paid or incurred by the
employer, up to $5,000, for dependent care assistance provided to the
employee if the assistance is furnished pursuant to a dependent care
assistance program. 5 In other words, a working parent, if taking
advantage of her employer's dependent care assistance program, has up
to $5,000 less in taxable income. However, this provision is not
necessarily helpful for many women because child-care costs may exceed
41 I.R.C. § 21(a) (1) (delineating that the child-care credit only applies to the
income tax imposed by chapter one of the Internal Revenue Code).
Id. § 21(a) (2).
Wealthier couples would benefit from a deduction because their taxable
income, and perhaps their marginal tax rate, would be reduced. If high enough, this
reduction could outweigh the credit-assuming no phase-outs.
3' Some commentators may argue that one-income earner households free the
other parent to spend more time with children. See infra Parts III.A & III.B for
rebuttal to this argument.
52 I.R.C. § 129 (2006).
51 Id. § 129(a). However, parents may have a tax-planning choice between this
dependent care assistance program and the child-care credit under I.R.C. § 21
(2006). See KLEIN ETAL., supra note 43, at 480.
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this amount and there is no requirement that an employer offer this
benefit.
In sum, married working women pay more in taxes than they would
if they were single in most circumstances. This is caused by the marriage
penalty and income stacking. Additionally, the marriage bonus
incentivizes the secondary income earner to forego income in order to
fall within a lower tax bracket in terms of household income.
Furthermore, if they have children, married women experience
additional disincentives to work due to child-care costs that do not
generate any meaningful tax break, even though child-care expenses are
a condition to entering the workforce.
Importantly, these disincentives for married women to work do not
automatically result from the bigger pool of taxable income that is
formed when two working people marry. Instead, they result from tax
policies that treat a married couple as a single economic unit for income
tax purposes, which under the current tax code generates a higher tax
bill for the secondary income earner than if she were single. Specifically,
many of the tax brackets for married couples are not double those of
single filers. This disincentivizes married women not only from working,
but also from aggressively pursuing upwardly-mobile careers.54 In some
cases, it may disincentivize marriage.
It cannot be denied, however, that the incentives for married women
to pursue paid work change with their income bracket, as well as with
their husband's fortunes.' In many households, financial need may
5' See Should You Go Back to Work?, SMARTMONEY.COM, Jan. 23, 2009,
http://www.smartmoney.com/Personal-Finance/Taxes/Should-You-Go-Back-to-
Work-9559. Furthermore, in a controversial article, one female Yale college student
was quoted, on the topic of resigning from a professional career in favor of becoming
a homemaker, "I accept things how they are .... I don't mind the status quo. I don't
see why I have to go against it." Louise Story, Many Women at Elite Colleges Set Career
Path to Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at AL, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/09/20/national/20women.html. But see Katha Pollitt, Desperate Housewives
of the Ivy League?, THE NATION, Oct 17, 2005, at 14, available at http://www.thenation.
com/doc/20051017/pollitt.
55 EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, MARRIAGE PENALTY
RELIEF IN THE NEW TAX LAW 2 (2003), available at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba445
("A marriage penalty may well affect the decision of poor people to marry. They
cannot afford to marry and, by and large, don't-one of the reasons why
approximately one out of four American children live in single-parent households. In
the middle- and upper-income classes, people do marry. The tax-influenced decision
for them is whether to have one or two wage earners.").
56 Nonetheless, the influence of household earnings on a woman's decision to
work may not be overly strong. Approximately 22.4% of all married couples have only
the husband participate in the labor force. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF
COMMERCE, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIvING ARRANGEMENTS: 2006, at tbl.FG2 (2006),
available at http://vvw.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006
.html. However, 19% of couples with an annual income of $100,000 or greater have
only the husband in the labor force. Id. In comparison, 28.4% of couples reporting
earnings of $30,000 to $39,000 have only the husband in the labor force. Id. But see
infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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compel women to ignore the after-tax return on their labor. Often times,
these women juggle significant domestic responsibilities with their shared
57role as economic providers. Other women's entry to the labor force may
be more discretionary. While this subset of women encompasses those of
extremely comfortable means, it also includes those who can afford
preferring leisure time with their families over increasing the net
economic wealth of their households or maintaining the value of their
human capital.58 An unfair tax code, however, impacts all of these
categories of women.
III. PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS
The power of the tax code is partially fueled by its dual effects: it
categorizes people and impacts their behavior, whether intentionally or
not. People are categorized as primary or secondary earners," hih tax
bracket earners or low ones, homemakers or wage-earners. The
consequences of such categorizations drive people's behavior." The
57 See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Why are Married Women Working So Hard?, 18 INT'L
REv. L. & ECON. 41, 41 (1998) ("[O]ne disconcerting development has been the
increase in the total number of hours worked by married women at home and on a
job."). Parkman suggests that one of the reasons for the increased hours has been the
advent of the no-fault divorce regime, which reduced married women's financial
security and compelled them to undertake paid work in addition to maintaining the
household. Id. at 42. See also infra Part III.B.
" For a brief discussion of the diminishing value of human capital, see infra note
87 and accompanying text.
59 This categorization is gender-neutral. If a woman earns more than her
husband, by definition she is the primary income earner, and it is her husband who
faces the tax disincentives to engage in paid work. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
'o One female lawyer shared her reaction to being categorized as a homemaker
after leaving the practice of law to raise her children, "Tim and I shared a good laugh
the first time I saw myself identified as a 'Homemaker' on our tax returns. Not
because Homemaker is not as noble a profession as the law is. But as it applied to
me-one who hates to cook, clean, sew, is not particularly talented in home design,
and one who is thoroughly flummoxed by a new sport called 'scrapbooking'-the
title 'Homemaker' is a misnomer." Susan Chapin Stubson, From Negotiating Clients to
Negotiating Toddlers, WvO. LAw., June 2006, at 22, available at http://wyomingbar.org/
pdf/barjournal/barjournal/articles/Toddlers.pdf.61 For the argument that economic incentives drive women's behavior, see
EdwardJ. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in
the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 1033, 1040-41 (1993) (arguing that Congress should
lower married women's tax rates to encourage both marriage and married women's
participation in the labor force). See also EDWARDJ. McCArFERY, TAXING WOMEN 19-23
(1997) (noting that because married couples often view the wife's income as
supplemental, which is taxed at higher marginal rates, the tax code provides a
disincentive for married women to work), andjennifer L. Venghaus, Comment, Tax
Incentives: A Means of Encouraging Research and Development for Homeland Security ?, 37 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1213, 1220 (2003) (suggesting that the tax code can change society's
behavior). However, other scholars have suggested that the tax code does not
influence people's behavior, but that people's behavior influences the tax code. See,
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federal income taxation system is thus an important factor shaping
economic incentives for people, aiming for fairness, neutrality, and
62efficiency. The code's current treatment of married working women,
however, does not maximize these aims.
63Although there are many reasons for the current tax policies, one
major justification offered for disincentivizing the secondary income
earner from pursuing paid work is her role in child-bearing and
rearing.64 In other words, one spouse should be encouraged to remain at
home to care for children. However, this argument is tempered by the
existence of a significant number of married women without minor
children, as well as the added benefits of a more neutral legal regime.
With the guiding principle that married women should not be
discouraged from the labor force, there are several possible resolutions
to the current tax disincentives they encounter. The most tenable ones
include making the taxation brackets of married couples, particularly
equal-earning couples, double those of single filers or offering offsets to
the marriage penalty. Any such discussion, of course, also applies to
couples where the secondary earner is the husband. Nonetheless, this
Part continues to focus mainly on women because, as detailed before,
65men remain the primary income earners.
A. Women with Minor Children and Those Without
One of the most natural and relevant bifurcations in the population
of married women arises from whether they have minor children. The
presence of children in a household inspires much of the relevant
debate, and perhaps justifiably. There are the age-old efficiency benefits
of having one spouse focus on a career while the other cares for the
e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. RENT. 1389, 1392
(1975) (arguing that the tax code codifies social mores); Erik M. Jensen, Jonathan
Barry Forman, Making America Work, 5 PITr. TAx REv. 165, 170 n.16 (2008) (book
review) (suggesting that the tax code is indifferent to whether the husband or wife is
the primary wage-earner, but that social expectations may be more sexist).
Reginald Mombrun, Let's Protect Our Economy and Democracy from Paris Hilton:
The Case for Keeping the Estate Tax, 33 OHio N.U. L. REv. 61, 83-84 (2007).
6' For an excellent review of Congress's rationale for certain tax policy decisions,
see Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 805, 806-21 (2008).
64 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case
Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 40
(2005) ("[There exists a] societal view that it would be best for women to remain
home with their children."); Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income
Workers, 28 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 (2007) ("This catchphrase [the opt-out
revolution] is used to describe highly educated professional women who have chosen
to leave their jobs to care for their children or to arrange reduced work hours to have
more time at home."); see alsoJacobsen & Levin, supra note 38, at 16 ("Women who
leave the work force are more likely to be married and to have children than are their
counterparts who remain in the work force.").65 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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household. Furthermore, hands-on and full-time parenting is desirable
for children.
Put in a more favorable light, therefore, the flip side of the tax
code's disincentives for the secondary earner to work is that it
incentivizes her to remain at home with children by lowering her
spouse's tax bill if she abstains from paid work. In this way, the current
tax code offers a subsidy for one parent to remain at home.
However, the problem is that current tax disincentives for married
women to enter the workforce generally remain the same whether or not
they are also the parents of minor children. In fact, the number of
married women without minor children slightly exceeds those with such
children: there are currently 33,059,000 married couples without
children under 18, as opposed to 26,469,000 married couples with minor
66children. Therefore, if the law provides strong incentives for a
secondary income earner to become a full-time caregiver at home, the
half of all women without children are penalized if they dedicate
themselves to paid work while being the secondary income earner.
For the purposes of any relevant debate, therefore, women should be
divided into two groups: those with minor children and those without
minor children. Society may choose to view each group of women
differently. Specifically, society may want to encourage, support, and
subsidize a woman with children to spend more time with those
children-particularly when her husband can earn more by himself than
if they were both working and having to pay child-care costs. No such
societal aims exist for women without minor children. Therefore, there is
no legitimate-and particularly child-oriented-reason for the law's
uniform discouragement of all married women's entry into the labor
force. The law should remain neutral, particularly when married women
without minor children exceed in number those with such children.
The current tax policy, which does not distinguish between married
mothers and married women generally, may be the reason that both
groups abstain from paid work at approximately the same rate. In other
words, there is only a small difference in the number of married mothers
working and the number of married women without minor children
working. Specifically, out of 26,469,000 married couple family units with
their own children under the age of eighteen, 7,923,000 couples belong
to a household wherein only the husband is in the labor force (29.9%). 6
However, of the 33,059,000 couples without their own children under
eighteen, 5,421,000 couples have only the husband in the labor force
(16.4%). 68 The difference between the participation of married women
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in the labor force between these two groups of family units-those with
minor children and those without-is only 13.5%.69
Thinking of married women as composed of two groups-those with
children and those without-therefore highlights the problem with
applying a uniform law to all of them, particularly when it is unfavorable
to the pursuit of paid work. Instead of distinguishing between these two
groups, however, the tax code fundamentally distinguishes between one-
income earner couples, two-income earner couples, and single
taxpayers-transferring wealth among them. 70 As one commentator
suggests, it would be difficult to completely eliminate the complaints of
every taxpayer in these three groups, particularly given the progressive
nature of the taxation system. However, a more marriage-neutral tax
code, one that does not penalize the secondary income earner, would
facilitate the desirable policy goals considered next, which result from
the encouragement of people to engage in paid work.
B. The Benefits of a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax
Although the current tax framework provides married women with
certain disincentives to work, the most desirable 9 oal of the system may
be neutrality in regards to these tax disincentives. Most notably, there is
simply insufficient justification for either an encouragement or
discouragement of all married women to participate in the workforce.
Given that there are two roughly equal groups of married women, those
with minor children and those without, it is difficult to reach fair results
with non-neutral laws.73 Furthermore, not all married women, in either
group, have the same work-life balance preferences, making it difficult to
achieve a universally fair tax law that is not neutral.
This issue of fairness also arose in the deductibility of child-care
expenses in Smith v. Commissioner.74 The tax court implicitly compared the
two-income earner couple with children to the two-income earner couple
without children, finding it unfair to favor those households with
children. However, there are many possible comparisons the court could
" One additional factor possibly influencing these statistics is that older spouses
with children over eighteen may be of a more traditional generation, where the wife
is usually a homemaker regardless of whether minor children are also present in the
household. Furthermore, women who spend most of their adult lives in the home
may experience such diminished human capital that it is not worthwhile for them to
enter the workplace even once they complete raising their children. See infra note 87.
70 See supra notes 33-35; infra text accompanying note 103.
", Zelenak, supra note 12, at 3. See also supra Part II.B.
71 "Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV's finance minister, famously said that the art
of taxation was like plucking a goose; the aim was to get the most feathers with the
least hissing. But tax policy should aim to do more than smother protest: it should
also seek to raise the most money with the least distortion to economic activity." A
Nasty Brown Mess, ECONOMIST, May 2, 2009, at 14.
3 See supra Part III.A.
74 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), affid, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940); see also supra text
accompanying notes 39-41.
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have made that would have produced different results, including a
comparison of the two-income earner couple with children to the one-
income earner couple with children v5 In this sort of comparison, it is
unfair that the one-income earner household has imputed income that is
not taxable because of the stay-at-home wife's services.76 The starkest
comparison, however, is that of a two-income earner couple with children
to a single-parent household that almost always incurs child-care costs as
a result of employment-which is essentially a requirement for the
deductibility of expenses. Yet, these expenses are not deductible because
they are considered by the courts to be personal expenses." Thus, the
concept of fairness changes depending on the comparisons drawn
among the various households. Unfortunately, courts have often chosen
to draw those comparisons that disfavor married women's paid work.
Congress's failure to override this view of the courts suggests that it
belongs not only to the courts, but also to Congress.
Furthermore, although one perceived goal of the taxation system
may be to strengthen the family unit by keeping one spouse at home with
the children, in reality the laws that create incentives for women to stay
home may weaken the family. First, one commentator has noted that, in
fact, equally financially dependent spouses are more likely to be equally
committed spouses. Second, by perverting a woman's choices simply
because of her marital status,8' a marriage penalty may deter or delay
working women from entering into marriage. This is particularly true of
lower income families where both partners are working at approximately
the same low wage. They are negatively impacted by the marriage penalty
75 KLEIN ETAL., supra note 43, at 478 n.1.
7' An argument has been made in favor of taxing the imputed income of a
homemaker to validate her decision, recognize the economic value of her
contribution, and provide social security benefits. See Staudt, supra note 40.
" Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039; I.R.C. § 262(a) (2006).
78 There are at least two aspects of fairness in this context. First, there is the idea
of horizontal equity, or the notion that similarly situated individuals should be
treated the same. Second, there is the idea of vertical equity, or that the tax treatment
of differently-situated persons should be fair. Vertical equity is a form of distributive
justice. Galle, supra note 9, at 1324-25.
7' There is no longer a typical household either. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("The demographic changes of the past
century make it difficult to speak of an average American family."); Developments in the
Law-The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1996, 2001 (2003) ("The
'nuclear family'-still the archetype in American law and politics-for the first time
describes less than one-quarter of all U.S. households.").
o Steven L. Nock, The Marriages of Equally Dependent Spouses, 22J. FAM. ISSUES 755,
764 (2001).
8 In fact, some commentators completely disapprove of the traditional gender
roles in marriage as a trap for man), women. See, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET
F. BRINING, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAw 1391 (2006) ("In the nineteenth century the
family was assailed as a prison by the Romantics and as an instrument of oppression
by the Marxists. Today, it is similarly assailed....").
8 See, e.g., Leah Ward Sears, Foreword, The Frontiers of Law, Religion, and Marriage,
58 EMORY LJ. 1, 5-6 (2008); see also McCAFFERY, supra note 55.
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by virtue of earning equal incomes in a tax structure wherein the married
filers' tax brackets are not exactly double the single filers' brackets,
starting at the 25% tax bracket.3 Professional couples who are married
also disproportionately suffer a higher tax bill-in such cases, one spouse
must also pay the couple's top marginal rate on most, if not all, of her
income. 4 Therefore, even if the tax system were trying to preserve the
familial unit, it has certain tendencies to undermine marriage. On the
contrary, a neutral legal framework would allow married women to allot
their time such that their households' utility would be maximized.
Furthermore, it is counterproductive to penalize working women
who desire the added income for the welfare of their families. As one
commentator notes, more American marriages today depend on two
incomes.8 " It is therefore not necessarily wise to assume, as the tax code
does, that married women with children need more time with their
children than money. No stretch of the imagination is necessary to
picture the varied and many scenarios in which the economic value of a
mother's paid work positively impacts her children. For example, many
mothers work to be able to afford private or religious schooling for their
children, or to fund their children's various extracurricular activities.
Other mothers need to work just to provide the basic necessities for their•• 86
families. These observations suggest that to disincentivize married
mothers from pursuing paid work is against their families' interests.
Also counterproductive is erecting disincentives for married women
to work when their human capital swiftly diminishes. Women who return
to the labor market often encounter a difficult transition with fewer
rewards from their work than if they had stayed in the workforce . Thus,
any incentive to quit the labor market provides an even greater
disincentive to return, given rapidly diminishing human capital.
However, it is increasingly important for women to maintain their
human capital. First, in the current economic recession, men are losing
their jobs at a higher rate than women, meaning that an increased
83 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
84 This may be reflected in one study's findings that women with MBA degrees,
upon having children, reduce their labor supply much more if they have higher-
earning husbands. See Bertrand et al., supra note 16, at 4.
8 Nock, supra note 80, at 755. ("I propose... the emerging form of American
marriage [is] a relationship in which couples are equally dependent on one another's
earnings."). Nock defines equally dependent spouses "as those who earn no less than
40% of total family earnings." Id. at 759.
86 O'Leary, supra note 64, at 3 ("Women living in poverty, who could once 'opt
out' of work to care for their young children, are now required to work while
receiving welfare .... ").
87 Jacobsen & Levin, supra note 38, at 14 ("First, women who leave the labor force
and later re-enter do not build up seniority, which, by itself, often leads to higher
wages. Second, women who return to the labor force are less likely to receive on-the-
job training to increase their productivity and thereby raise their pay. Third, when
women are not in the work force, their job skills may depreciate. Finally, employers
may view gaps in work history as a signal that women who leave may do so again.").
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number of households subsist only on the woman's income.8 Second, the
odds do not clearly favor lifelong marriages,8 9 notwithstanding people's
optimism regarding their unions. And following divorce, many women
struggle to maintain their households on a significantly reduced
income.9' Therefore, married women may choose to work in order to
protect themselves and their children from any financial difficulties in
92the event of a divorce. In such situations, reducing the incentives for a
mother to work goes against the interests of her children.
In addition to benefiting married women who find paid work
fulfilling, particularly when justified by attendant economic benefits, laws
that remain neutral on the question of a woman's decision to participate
in the labor force may benefit society. For example, one major problem
in the United States today is the lack of quality education for elementary
and high school students.9  One writer has predicted that California will
experience a shortage of tens of thousands of credentialed teachers by
" HEATHER BOUSHEY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, EQUAL PAY FOR BREADWINNERS 1
(2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2O09/01/gender_
economy-report.html/issues/2009/01/pdf/gender paper.pdf.
89 Americans for Divorce Reform, Inc., Divorce Rates, http://www.divorce
reform.org/rates.html. "[T]he marriage rate in 2003 was 7.5 per 1,000 total
population, but at the same time, the divorce rate was 3.8 per 1,000 total population.
Thus, in 2003, for every two marriages, there was a divorce." Margaret Berger
Strickland, Comment, What's Mine Is Mine: Reserving the Fruits of Separate Property
Without Notice to the Unsuspecting Spouse, 51 Loy. L. REV. 989, 990 (2005) (citing CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS: BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND DEATHS:
PROVISIONAL DATA FOR 2003 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_22.pdf).
9' See Margaret F. Brinig, Contracting Around No-Fault Divorce, in THE FALL AND RISE
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 275, 276 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Sean Hannon Williams,
Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts,
and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 757-61 (2009).
" In 1993, the mean income for divorced American mothers was $17,859, while
for divorced fathers it was $31,034. Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A
Constitutional Perspective, 34 U. LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. L. 1, 6 (1995). But see Kelly Bedard &
Olivier Deschfnes, Sex Preferences, Marital Dissolution, and the Economic Status of Women,
40 J. HUM. RESOURCES 411, 413 (2005) (arguing that divorced women live in
households with more income per person than never-divorced women). See also
Brinig, supra note 90, at 277 ("A great deal of research suggests that children of
parents who divorce will be worse off in the vast majority of cases. Children may lose
out for a number of reasons. They will be poorer than those of intact families ....").
92 Parkman, supra note 57, at 44 ("The likelihood increased that decisions by
married women to become employed outside the home were based on the women's
desire to protect themselves from the potentially adverse effects of no-fault divorce
rather than to improve their family's welfare.").
9' This is particularly true in the most problematic school districts around the
country. See, e.g., Brian W. Ludeke, Malibu Locals Only: "Boys Will Be Boys, "or Dangerous
Street Gang? Why the Criminal Justice System's Failure to Properly Identify Suburban Gangs
Hurts Efforts to Fight Gangs, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 309, 337 (2007) (suggesting that a
shortage of teachers may force students to use their peers as role models instead of
healthy adults, particularly when the students lack a stable family).
[Vol. 13:4
TAX DISINCENTIVES FOR MARRIED WOMEN
2014.94 Perhaps if the legal and economic frameworks were more neutral
for secondary income earners, they would occupy more of these family-
friendly roles in the workforce. However, when child-care costs and high
tax rates become factors, many secondary income earners may prefer to
remain at home rather than enter the labor force.
Finally, perhaps an argument can be made for the law's neutrality
toward married women in the form of the Equal Protection Clause. The
United States Constitution, mainly through the Fourteenth Amendment,
has increasingly been used in state family law cases. 95 Equal protection
has been a particularly popular argument in gendered family law
disputes.96 Although the Supreme Court permits family members' rights
to vary according to law, such distinctions must "serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives. 9 7 For this reason, courts have rejected, for example,
the presumption that mothers should win custody of their young
children in the case of divorce.98 Applying this logic to the legal
" Benjamin Michael Superfine, Using the Courts to Influence the Implementation of
No Child Left Behind, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 779, 819 n.243 (2006). The current
economic recession, however, has produced state deficits that may reduce the public
school systems' ability to hire new teachers.
15 For an insightful article on the federalization of family law, see Jerome A.
Barron, The Constitutionalization of American Family Law: The Case of the Right to Many,
in CROSS CURRENTs 257 (Sanford N. Katz et al. eds., 2000).
'6 Compare Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) (holding that equal
protection was violated by the New York Domestic Relations Law provision that
allowed an unmarried mother, but not an unmarried father, to block her child's
adoption because the sex-based discrimination advanced no important state interest),
with Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) ("If one parent has an
established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either
abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not
prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights."), and Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The Illinois Supreme
Court correctly held that the State may constitutionally distinguish between unwed
fathers and unwed mothers. Here, Illinois' different treatment of the two is part of
that State's statutory scheme for protecting the welfare of illegitimate children.").
Caban, 441 U.S. at 388 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
9 For a discussion of the rejection of the tender years presumption, see Suzanne
Reynolds et al., Back to the Future: An Empirical Study of Child Custody Outcomes, 85 N.C.
L. REv. 1629, 1649 (2007); see also SCHNEIDER & BRINING, supra note 81, at 876 ("The
doctrine [of the tender years presumption] has been attacked in recent years, in
significant part because it is thought to offend principles of gender equality and to be
an inadequate surrogate for the best-interests principle. The doctrine has in some
jurisdictions been abolished legislatively. In other jurisdictions, it has been abolished
by judicial decisions that find the presumption unsatisfactory on policy grounds. In
yet other jurisdictions, the presumption has been found to conflict with the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause as it has been interpreted in cases
like Orr v. Orr, 440 US 268 (1979). Finally, in some jurisdictions the presumption has
fallen before state equal-rights amendments."). However, in practice more women
still receive custody of their young children than men. Id. For a comparison of the
disfavored tender years presumption and the favored primary caretaker preference,
see KATZ, supra note 13, at 106 & 106 n.92.
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disincentives for married women to work may be difficult, but certainly
warrants some attention. 99 Most problematically, jurisprudence on the tax
code's treatment of parents would only apply the rational basis analysis,
which would likely be insufficient to attack the marriage penalty and
similar tax disincenives. Ultimately, however, it is not the law's place to
dictate how married women should allocate their time. Although some
may argue for a more feminist tax code, the tax code should be neither
feminist nor anti-feminist.
In conclusion, the law necessarily impacts people's behavior in
certain areas. Most illustratively, criminal law influences people's actions
for the benefit of society's safety. In regard to the decision of a married
woman to enter the workforce or a professional woman to enter
marriage, however, the law has less cause to be a major influence. There
is simply no support for either discouraging or encouraging all working
married women-neutral laws are the remaining option.
C. Recommendations to Achieve a More Neutral Tax Code for Married Women
Federal law therefore provides one of the most significant
disincentives for married women to work: the tax code. Indeed, both the
marriage penalty and the limitations on the child-care credit reveal a
unique philosophy regarding married women-it is more important to
treat them as part of a household than as individuals. Any unfairness they
incur by virtue of being primary child-care providers, their lower wages,
and their higher income tax brackets as secondary earners all become
fairer so long as the household is considered as a whole. This philosophy
inherently results from the tax code's treatment of the married couple as
an economic unit.'0 ' The married household benefits from slightly wider
income tax brackets, the married household benefits from a larger number
of personal exemptions, and the married household benefits from the
marriage bonus in one-income earner households. However, married
women face disincentives to engage in paid work because most of the
significant marriage tax benefits peak in one-income earner households.
There are several resolutions to these tax disincentives. 12 Of course,
it is insufficient to simply reduce the tax bill, in absolute terms, for any
particular subset of Americans suffering tax disadvantages under the
current system. Instead, the aim of any reform must be to eliminate the
discriminatory nature of the current tax code, which in essence transfers
9 For a similar discussion of the equal opportunities that must be afforded to
both married and unmarried women, see SCHNEIDER & BRINING, supra note 81, at
1416.
"o Jessica C. Kornberg, Comment, Jumping on the Mommy Track: A Tax for Working
Mothers, 17 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 187, 213 (2008).
'0t For an excellent analysis of this concept, see Shari Motro, A New "I Do"
Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOwA L. REv. 1509 (2006).
"0 For a summary of some potential resolutions, see Zelenak, supra note 12, at 3.
See also KLEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 633-36.
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money from relatively equal two-income earning married couples
through the tax penalty to one-income or to significantly unequal two-
income earning married couples through the marriage bonus. Such a
transfer is not justified and its elimination would eradicate the most
significant tax disincentives for the secondary income earner to enter the
workforce.
Most importantly, the married tax schedule could have taxation
brackets that are exactly double those of the single schedules. To avoid
favoring a one-income earner household by increasing the attendant
marriage bonus,0 4 these double brackets could be limited to couples that
have two-income spouses. However, the household's two incomes would
have to be similar in amount, or else the marriage bonus would continue
for significantly unequal earners. In other words, if one spouse earns
$75,000 and the other earns $900, and if their tax brackets are double
those of single filers, they benefit from a sizeable marriage bonus.
1°5
Therefore, double tax brackets could be limited to not only two-income
106earning spouses, but also to similarly earning spouses. Here, Professor
Nock's definition of equally dependent spouses "as those who earn no
less than 40% of total family earnings" can be helpful in determining
which two-income earner households should benefit from tax brackets
double those of single filers.1
0 7
Nonetheless, even if all married households were to enjoy tax
brackets double those of single filers' brackets-notwithstanding the
attendant marriage bonus-the resulting system would be a mere return
to the tax structure in 1948, which was undone in 1969 in response to
single filers who resented the attendant windfall to one-income earner,
married households.0 0 This criticism has eased, however, by virtue of the
fact that there are many more households with two-income earners today
that are hurt by the marriage penalty than in the 1960s, due to a steep
increase of women's participation in the labor force.10 9 The flip side, of
course, is that there are fewer households with one-income earner
married couples that benefit from the marriage bonus than in the
1960s."0  This helps alleviate the historical complaint that most
households, by virtue of consisting of one-income earner married
'1' See supra notes 33-35, 70 and accompanying text.
'04 See supra Part II.B.
'o0 See id.
'0' This could be achieved through, for example, a separate filing schedule or
separate taxation rates for these married couples.
107 Nock, supra note 80, at 759.
Zelenak, supra note 12, at 5-6.
In 1967, there were 34,391,000 women with some kind of earnings, compared
with 74,295,000 women in 2007. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 18, at tbl.P-41. See
also Ellen Yau et al., Comparing Salaries and Wages of Women Shown on Forms W-2 to Those
of Men, 1969-1999, STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 2003, at 274, 278-79 tbl.1, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/99inw2wm.pdf.
"0 Nonetheless, it is true that the amount and reach of the marriage bonus is
currently very large. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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couples, would unfairly benefit from the marriage bonus as a result of tax
brackets that were double those of single taxpayers."'
Moreover, not only do more women work today, but they also earn
more than they did in 1969.1l2 This justifies increasing the taxation
brackets for married filers in order to avoid marriage penalties that were
rarer in 1969, when married women's smaller or nonexistent income did
not necessitate significantly larger marriage tax brackets to accommodate
their added income.
Such a failure of the tax code to reflect changing reality is also
illustrated by the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). The AMT, a
separate taxation plan created in the 1960s, aimed to remedy the
previously frequent situation wherein ultra high-income households
owed little or no income tax because of various tax benefits. As the AMT
was not indexed to inflation and because of subsequent tax cuts, more
middle-class households have become subject to the AMT over time-to
their great disadvantage.'1 4 Furthermore, the AMT imposes significant
marriage penalties because its exemption for couples is less than double
the exemption for singles and, unlike the regular tax system, the AMT
lacks a separate set of tax brackets for married households.' 5
Of course, to avoid the marriage penalty in the tax code, there could
be no separate marriage filing at all. However, marriage would then lose
its special status in the tax code despite the potential public policy
benefits of:. (1) supporting marriage and (2) treating the marital couple
as one economic unit. Therefore, in the alternative, each spouse could
be progressively taxed as an individual to avoid small marital tax brackets
and income stacking, while simultaneously keeping the various current
benefits of filing jointly as a married couple, such as favorable
deductions. This would maintain the significance of the marriage status
under the tax code without counterproductively penalizing it.
Alternatively, tax reform measures might include expanding
deductions to offset the marriage penalty, again focused on two-income
earner households. Furthermore, as already noted in this Part, roughly
equal two-income earner couples could have taxation schedules or rates
different from one-income and significantly unequal two-income earner
l2 See supra Part II.B.
1 In 1969, women earned only 590 for every $1 men made, versus the 77¢ to the
$1 they earned in 2007. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 18, at tbl.P-40. Furthermore,
in 1969, the average female joint filer reported earnings of $3,429, as opposed to
$24,110 in 1999. Yau et al., supra note 109, at 278-79 tbl.1.
.. For background on the AMT, see Michael D. Kim, Comment, The Downward
Creep: An Overview of the AMT and Its Expansion to the Middle Class, 6 DEPAUL Bus. &
COM. L.J. 451, 461 (2008).
114 Id.
115 Id.
16 Debating the public policy benefits of marriage and the treatment of spouses
as one economic unit is beyond the scope of this Article, which, in suggesting reform
measures within the current tax framework, assumes such benefits occur.
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married couples.' 7 Of course, legislation benefiting two-income earner
married couples must avoid disadvantaging one-income earner married
couples or single taxpayers."" However, any policy decision aiming to
eliminate the tax disincentives for working married women requires
eliminating the marriage penalty, at the risk of simultaneously
aggravating the marriage bonus that disadvantages single taxpayers.119
As for the tax code's lack of distinction between married mothers
and married women without children, 2 ° one potential compromise
might be to change the tax law so as to incentivize one-income earner
married households, and therefore to incentivize homemaking, but only
when there are dependents in the household. In other words, families
with minor children in the household could be supported by the tax laws
through more substantial deductions, tax credits, or an entirely separate
tax rate schedule. This way, not all married women would be so
significantly disincentivized from seeking paid work.
The problem with this approach, however, is that it may be difficult
to justify favoring only those households with children, as the tax court
noted in Smith v. Commissioner.12 1 One justification can certainly be the
higher expense of maintaining such households and the public policy
goal of encouraging high birth rates, which thereby may warrant tax
relief on public policy grounds. 2 2 Still, subsidizing only households with
children would further be complicated by the fact that not all households
desire the same ratio of labor to leisure time and not all married women,
or mothers, have uniform utility curves, meaning that any specifically
formulated tax advantage or disadvantage for married women does not
equally apply to everybody similarly situated.
2
3
Nonetheless, any of these recommended tax changes would help
neutralize the law toward working women who are married. The problem
with implementing such recommendations, however, is the resulting cost
to the federal treasury. To be politically viable, therefore, any solution
may require an adjustment of the marginal tax rate brackets to
sufficiently offset the cost of such reform. Furthermore, any tax code
"7 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
... For an excellent discussion of the legislation benefiting only two-income
earner married couples, see Zelenak, supra note 12, at 14-17.
'9 See supra Part II.B.
"0 See supra Part III.A.
"' Smith v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), affd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940). See
also supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
22 The Japanese government, for example, has been aiming to combat relatively
low birth rates, and "[t]he government's proposals are meant to counter a variety of
Japanese policies and cultural issues believed to discourage parenthood. On the
policy front, Japanese tax laws encourage single-income families with a tax deduction
that keeps many mothers at home." Daisuke Wakabayashi & Miho Inada, Baby Bundle:
Japan's Cash Incentive for Parenthood, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2009, at A13, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125495746062571927.html.
213 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. See also supra Part III.B.
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124reform may necessitate significant political maneuvering because any
solution, despite aiming for fairness, may inherently worsen the financial
situation for some taxpayers while improving it for others.
2 5
Importantly, however, the recommended changes would not
necessarily cost the U.S. Treasury inordinately-by eliminating the
incentives for married women to abstain from the work force, more
taxable income is generated, thereby increasing the taxes collected.
Specifically, the average two-income earner household would see a
decrease in taxes, but it would not be overly dramatic. 126Yet, the prospect
of extra income, not taxed at the higher rates for secondary income
earners, would translate to increased incentive for the secondary income
earner to pursue paid work. 1 7 Moreover, the current tax revenues
generated from the marriage penalty are simply transferred to fund the
marriage bonus of one-income and significantly unequal two-income128
earner couples. Eliminating this transfer would therefore have little net
effect on the Treasury.
These recommendations are particularly important to implement if
federal taxation rates lapse to the higher, pre-2001 levels. As the marriage
penalty and bonus both result from the progressive nature of income
taxation, any tax increase will exacerbate them. For example, two single
people each earning $105,000 would each pay at the 28% rate."0 Once
married, they move into the 33% bracket. 131Under pre-2001 rates, their
bracket increases to 36%.132 However, if the wife drops out of the labor
market, they would be taxed at the 25% rate in 2009 or at the 28% rate
133pre-2001. Any proposed increases in social security and Medicare
payments further disincentivize the secondary income earner's decision
to join the labor force. Therefore, to achieve the goal of advancing
women's issues in the labor market, any increase of income taxes must
124 The details of which fall beyond the scope of this Article.
'15 See supra Part II.B.26 However, it is true that collectively these household savings would more
substantially cost the U.S. Treasury in tax revenue. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text. Nonetheless, these costs should at least partially be offset by the
increased creation of taxable income resulting from the elimination of many people's
tax disincentives to work.
27 See supra Part II.B.
210 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
2' See supra Part II.B.
10 The 2009 marginal dollar triggering amounts for each successive tax bracket
can be found in the notes following I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. 2009). Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-
46 I.R.B. 1107, 1109-10; supra note 29.
1' I.R.C. § 1; supra note 29.
12 I.R.C. § 1 (2000) (current version at I.R.C. § 1 (2006)). See Diana Furchtgott-
Roth, Editorial, Obama Wife Penalty, N.Y. SUN, Aug. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.nysun.com/opinion/obama-wife-penalty/84829.
133 See supra note 29; I.R.C. § 1 (2000) (current version at I.R.C. § 1 (2006));
Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 132.
'3 To advance such issues, President Obama signed, as his first law, the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Law. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2,
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be offset by a corresponding reduction of the tax code's disincentives for
married women to work. In the meantime, the tax code remains highly
unfavorable for married women in the workforce.
IV. CONCLUSION
Among the most fundamental barriers to the aggressive participation
of many married women in the work force are economic disincentives.
Perhaps one of the most significant culprits is the federal income tax
code's treatment of secondary income earners, mostly composed of
married women. Enacted by Congress to apply to everybody equally, the
code instead significantly disadvantages married working women.
Specifically, the tax code currently contains a marriage penalty,
which is aggravated by the progressive nature of taxation and is sensitive
to increases in taxation. Meanwhile, the relatively small child-care credit
requires that child-care expenses not exceed the secondary income, and
disappears through income phase-outs. A better approach would be to
craft more significant offsets to the marriage penalty for all working
women, and more generous child-care tax credits that do not pervert
incentives. Otherwise, the tax code continues to distort married women's
choices and behavior, constituting a factor that impacts their presence
and advancement in the workforce.
Without a doubt, it would be an oversimplification to mandate a
simple reduction of the tax bill, in absolute terms, for a subset of
Americans in an effort to redress these problems. Instead, the aim of any
reform must be to eliminate the discriminatory nature of the current tax
code, which in essence transfers money from two-income earner married
couples through the tax penalty to one-earner and to substantially
unequal two-income earner married couples through the marriage
bonus. Such a transfer is unjustified and its elimination would eradicate
the most significant tax disincentives for the secondary income earner to
work.
Married women today encounter more obligations than ever before.
Many of them share the role of economic provider with their husbands
while maintaining a high proportion of the domestic work and child-
rearing. To penalize them by decreasing their take home pay or by
erecting disincentive barriers is simply counterproductive in most
situations. They should neither be punished nor rewarded for the simple
act of accepting paid work, but should instead labor under more neutral
laws. After all, whether to pursue paid work should be a simpler question
than most.
123 Stat. 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2009)). He also signed an executive order
forming the White House Council on Women and Girls. Exec. Order No. 13,506, 74
Fed. Reg. 11,271 (Mar. 11, 2009). These initiatives focus on promoting women in the
workforce, but, as this Article argues, one of the most effective ways to do so is to
increase their take home pay by neutralizing the tax penalties that burden working
married women.
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